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Abstract 
The paper aims to analyze the evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy from the stand point of two 
competing  approaches:  the  intergovernmentalist  theory,  based  on  rational  institutionalism,  and  the 
constructivist theories in integration studies. I also attempt an evaluation of their analytical importance inside 
the  theoretical  research  concerning  CFSP.  The  contribution  of  this paper  lies in  emphasizing  that  even  if 
interests,  material  and  negotiation  power  and  asymmetrical  interdependence  are  useful  starting  points  in 
analyzing the potential influence of states on early institutional evolution, power alone does not explain the final 
outcomes of this evolution or of the policies pursued inside the CFSP.  
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Introduction
The paper aims to analyze the evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy from the 
stand  point  of  two  competing  approaches:  the  intergovernmentalist  theory,  based  on  rational 
institutionalism, and the constructivist theories in integration studies. I also attempt an evaluation of 
their analytical importance inside the theoretical research concerning CFSP.  
  In the first part of the paper I discuss the main theoretical assumptions associated with 
intergovernmentalism with an emphasis on liberal intergovernmentalism. In this section I will also 
underline  the  methodological roots that the liberal  intergovernmentalism borrowed  from rational 
institutionalism. In the second section, I seek to outline the constructivist approaches in integration 
studies, with their emphasis on the importance of identity for the evolution and the implementation of 
CFSP.  In  the  third  section  and  fourth  sections,  I  briefly  consider  the  evolution  of  the  CFSP 
institutionalization and I will present some empirical cases that can be successfully explained using 
identity as an independent variable. I conclude with an evaluation on the dynamics and interactions 
between interests and identity and I seek to asses the advantages and disadvantages that rest with 
each theory taken into consideration. 
  The  contribution  of  this  paper  lies  in  emphasizing  that  even  if  interests,  material  and 
negotiation  power  and  asymmetrical  interdependence  are  useful  starting  points  in  analyzing  the 
potential influence of states on early institutional evolution, power alone does not explain the final 
outcomes of this evolution or of the policies pursued inside the CFSP. 
The  intergovernmentalist  approaches  and  rational  institutionalism  in  theorizing  the 
CFSP
In the following section I will present the intergovernmentalist (IG) approaches in theorizing 
the CFSP. The first part of the section contains an overview of the different types of IG and their 
place inside the larger field of integration studies. In the last part of the section, I will present the 
hypotheses formulated by these theories regarding the field of CFSP. 
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European Higher Education Area”, co-funded by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectorial 
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Before embarking on the presentation of the theories brought into discussion, I want to stress 
their intellectual roots in the field of international relations
1, a point to which I will return to during 
the  following  presentation.  As  for  IG  approaches,  although  they  might  appear  to  favor  realist 
assumptions  in  their  explanations,  they  are  not  realist  per  se.  As  Rosamond  points  out, 
“intergovernmentalists  of  various  persuasions  are  distinguished  from  realists  because  they  are 
attentive to the fact that the (international) politics of European integration takes place within a very 
specific  institutional  environment”
2. The  IG  approaches  are  rather  liberal  institutionalist  in  their 
origins because  they  treat  the  EU  as  an  international regime  where  national  security  is  not  the 
dominant  motivation,  states  power  is  not  based  on  coercive  capabilities,  state  preferences  and 
identities are not uniform, and interstate institutions are not insignificant
3. This association is justified 
in the light of the fact that these theories emphasize the influence of institutionalization on state 
behavior.
IG emerged in the context of the lack of progress in European integration in the late 1960’ and 
of  the  apparent  failure  of  neofunctionalism  in  explaining  these  phenomena.  One  of  the  first 
proponents of the IG approach was Stanley Hoffmann, the most famous supporter of traditional or 
classical IG. His main theoretical concern was to emphasize “the importance of national interests in 
the international politics of post-war Europe”
4. He explained the tension between integration and 
diversity in Western Europe after the Empty Chair Crisis through the incursions of supranational 
principles and institutions in the sensitive areas related to national sovereignty. In order to ground his 
explanatory approach, Hoffman
5 resorts to the distinction between high politics (the politics of “vital 
national  interests”  and  military  security)  and  low  politics  (dominated  especially  by  economic 
matters). In Rosamond’s formulation, Hoffmann’s basic assumptions about the integration at that 
moment was that high politics is an autonomous domain, “virtually immune from the penetration of 
integrative impulses”
6, even if the governments were cooperating in the field of low politics in order 
to maintain control over the areas where intersocietal transactions became pervasive. In other words, 
his theory didn’t give much chances of success to integration in domains like foreign policy and 
national security. 
In the same IG tradition, economic historian Alan Milward tries to argue that, rather than 
undermining the nation-state, the integration process and the EU saved it. He points out that after the 
Second  World  War,  European  governments  were  confronted  with  two  dilemmas:  rising 
interdependence and societal discontent. They  opted for integration as a solution to the need to 
provide  public  policies  for  their  domestic  constituencies  and  to  mitigate  the  negative  effects  of 
interdependence.
7
The preoccupation for the domestic context of the state is also illustrated by liberal IG, one of 
the most developed theoretical strands of IG. Andrew Moravcsik is the main exponent of this theory 
which some main characteristics: it is an application of rational institutionalism used to explain 
interstate cooperation; it is a “ grand  theory that seeks to explain the broad evolution of regional 
1  For  a  broad  discussion  on  the  relationship  between  the  field  of  international  relations  and  European 
integration studies see Morten Kelstrup and Michael Williams, (ed.) International Relations Theory and the Politics of 
European Integration. Power, Security and Community (London: Routledge, 2000). 
2 Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (Basingstoke, Macmillan and New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 2000), 141-142. 
3 Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism”, in European Integration 
Theory ed. Thomas Diez, and Antje Wiener (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 68; 
4 Rosamond, Theories… , 76.
5 Stanley Hoffmannn, Sisiful european. Studii despre Europa (1964-1994), trans. Elena Neculcea (Bucure ti: 
Curtea Veche Publishing, 2003). 
6 Rosamond, Theories… ,77; 
7 Alan, Milward, apud. Rosamond, Theories… ,138-139. 1697
integration”
8 and it is a parsimonious theory that uses a limited number of parameters (among which 
the decisive one is the domestic issue-specific preference structure of a few major states)
9.
  Regarding the first characteristic mentioned above, the theories in the fields of international 
relations or European integration studies that build on rational institutionalism share some basic 
assumptions:  individualism,  state-centrism,  materialism,  egoism  and  instrumentalism
10.
Individualism refers to the fact that the agent (and not the structure) with given and relatively stable 
identity  and  interests  is  the  primary  generator  of  social  practices.  In  the  rational  institutionalist
approaches in international relations and European integration studies, the agent is not the individual, 
but a collective actor: the state, whose unitary character is assumed. Materialism refers to the fact that 
the distribution of power and wealth are the main variables that explain the processes and variations 
in  international  politics.  This  doesn’t  mean  that  institutions  are  not  important  but  that  they  are 
generated by the materials interests of agents and do not modify their identities or interests, only cost-
benefit  calculations.  The  institutions  are  intervening  variables  between  the  actors  and  the 
environment  and  between  individual  and  collective  action.  The  good  functioning  of  institutions 
depends on their utility to the actors. They act on the basis of concern for their benefits and not for 
the  others  benefits  (they  are  egoistic).  The  last  characteristic  of  rational  institutionalism, 
instrumentalism, refers to the fact that actors act according to rational instrumentalism: they try to 
maximize their own utility. But generally, this assumption is relaxed through “bounded rationality” 
which assumes that actors don’t have to be strict utility maximizers, to posses all the information 
about the consequences of their actions or to have the capacity to process this information
11. Building 
on these characteristics it can be argued, like Schimmelfennig, that “the assumption of rational states 
acting in a materially structured system and the rationalist indifference to actor-specific cognitions 
and individual as well as social meanings suggest an objectivist analysis”
12. Moreover, theories that 
are  rooted  in  rational  institutionalism  emphasize  that  agents  operate  according  to  the  logic  of 
consequentiality,  not  according  to  the  logic  of  appropriateness.  “In  a  logic  of  consequentiality, 
behaviors  are  driven  by  preferences  and  expectations  about  consequences.”
13  and  this  logic  is 
associated with anticipatory choice. On the other hand, the logic of appropriateness is associated with 
obligatory action
14 and it involves fulfilling the obligations of a role in a situation
15 and actions are 
chosen by recognizing a situation as being familiar, typical. 
  Returning to the other characteristics of liberal IG, it is worth mentioning that the latter is 
using three theoretical subcomponents: a liberal or societal theory of national preference formation; a 
theory  of  international  negotiations  and  a  functional  theory  of  institutional  choice
16.  The  main 
assumption of liberal IG  is that rational  and unitary states are the most important actors in the 
international  anarchical  context  and  international  institutions  such  as  the  EU  are  the  result  of 
negotiations between states that “continue to enjoy pre-eminent decision-making power and political 
legitimacy”
17. The “unitary actor” character of the state is given by the fact that domestic political 
8 Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism”, 67-68. 
9 Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism”, 85. 
10 Frank Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rethoric (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 18-19. 
11 Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO..., 19; 
12 Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO…, 21, author’s emphasis; 
13 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics (New 
York: Free Press, 1989), 160; 
14 March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions…, 23; 
15 March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions…, 160-161; 
16 Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism”, 69; 
17 Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism”, 68; 1698  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Administration
negotiations, representation and diplomacy generate a consistent preference function
18. However, this 
does not mean that domestic actors don’t play an independent and significant role in the negotiations 
beyond the state because “multiple representation can be consistent with the rational actor model - as 
long as it is consistent with a preference ordering.”
19 Thus, the liberal character of IG comes from the 
fact that it offers an interpretation of national preference formation which tries to take full account of 
the diversity of commercial, industrial, monetary and social interests in a state and “the readiness of 
the  nation-state  to  negotiate  agreements  if  the  complex  balance  of  different  domestic  interests 
requires it”
20. As one of the analysts and admirers of Moravcsik’s theory, Roger Morgan, observes, 
although the theoretician of liberal IG accepts that the idea of Europe –the vision of a European 
federation- has played some role in the integration process, Moravcsik insists that “the EC has been, 
for the  most  part,  the  deliberate creation of  statesmen  and  citizens  seeking to realize  economic 
interest through traditional diplomatic means”. The paradox is that these traditional means lead to a 
result which is very non-traditional indeed: the persistent widening and deepening of the EC/EU by 
“repeated transfers of sovereign prerogatives”
 21.
  From  a  liberal  IG  perspective,  international  cooperation  can  be  explained  by  three 
processes: states define their preferences, then they negotiate agreements and they create or adjust 
institutions in order to secure certain outcomes
22. Thus, Moravcsik considers that “EU integration can 
be best understood as a series of rational choices made by national leaders. These choices responded 
to  constraints  and  opportunities  stemming  from  the  economic  interests  of  powerful  domestic 
constituents, the relative power of states stemming from asymmetrical interdependence, and the role 
of  institutions  in  bolstering  the  credibility  of  interstate  commitments”
23.  His  perspective  was 
sometimes  criticized  because  it  favours  economic  interests  and  explanations  dominated  by 
producers’ interests. This critique seems legitimate taking into consideration that the supporters of 
liberal IG acknowledge that its ideal application on a concrete case is the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP)
24. CAP is a policy which has a prevailing economic side dominated by the interests of 
the producers. Moreover, Moravcsik considers that state preferences regarding European integration 
have reflected mainly concrete economic interests rather than other general concerns like security or 
European  ideals.  However,  Moravcsik  and  Schimmelfennig  acknowledge  that  in  non-economic 
domains, like foreign policy, the economic factor can be less important in calculations regarding a 
specific policy. Also, the authors admit that geopolitical interests had a role, albeit a secondary one, 
in European integration
25.
  Concerning the relative bargaining power –considered by liberal intergovernmentalists a 
crucial  factor  in  determining  the  outcomes  of  an  international  negotiation,  they  argue  that  it  is 
determined  by  asymmetrical  interdependence:  the  uneven  distribution  of  the  benefits  of  an 
agreement, and by the information about preferences and agreements
26.
  The  institutional  framework  is  considered  by  liberal  IG  as  an  important  element  in 
facilitating positive sum negotiations
27. Institutions help states to collectively arrive at a superior 
18 Moravcsik’s theory of state preference formation resembles the logic of two-level games theory in foreign 
policy analysis. The seminal article for this theory is Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic 
of Two-Level Games”, International Organization 42, 3 (1988): 427-460. 
19 Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism”, 86, n. 4; 
20 Roger Morgan, “A European `society of states' - but only states of mind?”, International Affairs 76, 3 
(2000): 568. 
21 Moravcsik apud Morgan, “A European `society of states'…”, 568-569. 
22 Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism”, 68-69. 
23 Moravcsik, apud Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism”, 69. 
24 Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism”, 77-79. 
25 Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism”, 70. 
26 Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism”, 71. 
27 Rosamond, Theories…, 142; Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Intergovermentalism”, 72. 1699
outcome by reducing transaction costs and providing the necessary information in order to reduce 
state’s  uncertainty  about  each  other’s  behavior  and  future  preferences.  Also,  liberal 
intergovernmentalists  claim  to  accept  some  of  the  assumptions  traditionally  attributed  to 
neofunctionalism and historical institutionalism such as the fact that institutions can have unintended 
and unwanted consequences but also argue that the later theories overinterpret their consequences
28.
Moreover, Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig accept two limitations of liberal IG
29. The first is related 
to the fact their theory explains best policy-making in areas where social preferences are relatively 
well defined. Thus, “the weaker and more diffuse the domestic constituency behind a policy and the 
more  modest  or  uncertain are  “the  substantial  implications  of  a  choice,  the  less  predictable  are 
national preferences and the more likely ideological preferences and beliefs” may be influential. The 
second  limitation  acknowledged  by  the  authors  refers  to  the  fact  that  in  the  case  of  both  high 
transaction costs and asymmetrical information, supranational institutions will have greater influence. 
  As  I  have  mentioned  above,  traditional  IG  were  sceptical  regarding  advanced  political 
integration, especially in the fields of foreign policy and security. These domains were considered as 
highly  connected  with  the  survival  of  the  state  and  belonged  to  the  deepest  layers  of  state 
sovereignty. Thus, IG insisted that the analysis of these areas can be approached appropriately only 
through  interpretation  of  intergovernmental  negotiations  by  the  schools  of  thought  tributary  to 
rational institutionalism. 
  In his analysis regarding CFSP, Koenig-Archibugi
30 argues that the integration, generally 
and  specifically in  the field  of CFSP  is decided in  Intergovernmental Conferences,  that  lead  to 
“grand” bargains, whose terms are written in the basic treaties of the EU. Regarding integration in the 
CFSP area, the European governments had different positions that influenced the duration of the 
negotiations. The author mentions the situation that occurred during the 1996-1997 IGC which lead 
to the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty, when EU foreign ministers or their representatives met more 
than  twenty  times  to  discuss  the  possible  revisions  of  the  provisions  regarding  CFSP  in  the 
Maastricht Treaty. Generally, the option for deeper integration in the case of the CFSP is related to 
pooling sovereignty (when states accept to take decisions that apply to all without the possibility of 
national veto) or to delegating sovereignty (the process through which states transfer their decisional 
power regarding an issue or a field to supranational institutions in the EU). Concretely, the pooling of 
sovereignty refers to accepting the qualified majority voting system in the Council of Ministers for 
the decisions  in the  CFSP field  (or  at least  decisions  regarding  implementation)  and  delegating 
sovereignty means increasing the powers of the Commission and the European Parliament in CFSP, 
mitigating the intergovernmental character of the CFSP through the fusion of the three pillars and 
financing CFSP operations from the community budget instead of ad-hoc contributions from the 
states.
31
   Approaching the issues of state preferences, Koenig-Archibugi makes the observation that 
although, in the 1990’, most states that wanted a supranational CFSP also wanted including defence 
in the EU’s competences, this coincidence was not general: some states supporting the deepening of 
the  integration  didn’t  want  to  extend  it  to  issues  of  defence  and  security  and  viceversa.  This 
observation is confirmed in the case of France, that encouraged the creation of a European defence 
identity but opposed taking decisions on a supranational level in CFSP or in defence and security 
matters. The position of the UK, until 1998, was to oppose both undertakings. From 1998, the 
attitude of the British government approximated the French government’s position: they did not 
oppose a role in defence for EU, but kept its reticence towards supranational procedures, favouring 
28 Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Intergovermentalism”, 75. 
29 Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Intergovermentalism”, 76-77. 
30 Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, “Explaining Government Preferences for Institutional Change in EU Foreign 
and Security Policy”, International Organization 58, 1 (2004): 137-174. 
31 Koenig-Archibugi, “Explaining Government Preferences…”, 140-141. 1700  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Administration
intergovernmental procedures. Koenig-Archibugi attributes the progress of CFSP to the convergence 
of French and British positions. By contrast, the Netherlands, during the 1990-1991 IGC, supported a 
supranational foreign policy but opposed the development of a European defence
32.
  As I have mentioned earlier, the standpoint of rationalist institutionalism assumes that the 
agents  act  according  to  instrumental  rationality  and  that  the  pre-eminent  explanation  is  based  on 
material factors. From here it can be deduced that governments would prefer different institutional 
arrangements because they have different interests and different resources. In the first interpretation, 
focusing on interests, governments support or oppose the creation of institutions or decision-making 
procedures if they believe or not that these will determine results that correspond to their exogenously 
determined interests
33. Thus, in the context of the CFSP, states’ opposition to supranational institutions 
is related to the concern that once introduced, the EU would take decisions that would be contrary to 
state  preferences.  Regarding  the  pooling  of  sovereignty,  states  might  fear  that  the  supranational 
institutions might  have  the  tendency  to  privilege  the  preferences  of a majority  of  member  states, 
especially where the preferences of some states do not correspond with those of the majority. 
  The  second  interpretation,  that  stresses  the  distribution  of  resources  (power)  as  an 
explaining factor of the variations in the interests of each state is usually associated with realist 
theories in international relations. From this perspective, the states whose power allows them to 
pursue an independent and effective foreign policy do not manifest the tendency to give up their 
autonomy in favour of supranational institutions. On the other hand, less powerful states are more 
interested in developing a more integrated foreign and security policy because of two reasons: 1. in 
the hope that their influence in global issues will rise when the EU will act as a global actor; 2. 
because a more robust institutional framework might constrain the more powerful states, whose 
foreign policy might become threatening, not to become a danger in the future.
34
1. The constructivist approach, integration studies and the theorizing on CFSP 
In this section of the paper I will emphasize the explanations provided by the constructivist 
approaches
35 regarding European integration in the field of foreign and security policy. In the first 
part  of  the  section  I  describe  the  general  characteristics  and  assumptions  of  the  constructivist 
approaches in international relations and their most important versions. I will then try to present their 
relevance for integration  theories and their  explanatory value in the context of the evolution of 
integration. 
Although they differ in some of their assumptions, the constructivist approaches exhibit some 
common characteristics. First of all, they question the claim of rationalist approaches to explain the 
socially constructed world solely through conventional procedures of rationalist research
36. Another 
characteristic of the approaches discussed here is their scepticism towards “grand theories” that try to 
explain all social practices regardless of space and time
37. Constructivism tends towards a rather 
contextualized theorization that does not claim to be a general theory of social sciences and most 
constructivists even refuse to call their explanatory model a “theory”, preferring to consider it an 
analytical framework
38.
32 Koenig-Archibugi, “Explaining Government Preferences…” 140, n. 9. 
33 Koenig-Archibugi, “Explaining Government Preferences…”, 143. 
34 Koenig-Archibugi, “Explaining Government Preferences…”, 144. 
35  These  approaches are  often called “sociological  institutionalism”,  defined  as “a  version  of  institutional 
research inspired by constructivism” (Risse 2009: 158). However, the approaches discussed here include a broader 
range of approaches that  stress other factors  besides institutions, such  as  Self/Other interactions – which  may  be 
included in the strand of poststructuralism/critical constructivism. 
36 Rosamond, Theories… ,172. 
37  Thomas  Risse,  “Social Constructivism and  European  Integration”  in European  Integration Theory,  ed. 
Thomas Diez, and Antje Wiener (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 145. 
38 Christian Reus-Smith, “Constructivismul” in Teorii ale rela iilor interna ionale, ed. Burchill, S. et al (Ia i: 
Institutul European, 2008), 221. 1701
The first assumption of constructivist approaches that I will present
39 refers to the importance 
that they assign to ideal or normative factors. Thus, “to the extent that structures can be said to shape 
the behaviour of social and political actors […] constructivists hold that normative or ideational 
structures are just as important as material structures”
40. As Wendt argues: “this does not mean that 
material power and interests are unimportant, but rather that their meaning and effects depend on the 
social  structure  of  the  system”
41  to  which  they  belong.  Moreover,  the  normative  or  ideational 
structure in which the agent acts constitutes his social identity. This assumption is related to the fact 
that the sociological institutionalism approaches emphasize what I previously defined as the “logic of 
appropriateness”. Unlike instrumental behaviour, the one guided by rules and norms differs through 
the fact that actors try to do the “appropriate thing”, to determine the adequate rule for a given social 
situation. Concerning the analytical importance given to the non-material structure it can be argued 
that the constructivist approaches are often regarded as privileging structural rather than agent-based 
explanations. But this observation is only valid for some of the versions of constructivism, as we 
shall see below. 
Another assumption of constructivist approaches is that identities structure interests which in 
turn  influence  behaviour.  Unlike  the  approaches  in  rational  institutionalism,  the  constructivists
emphasize the fact that the interests and preferences of the actors are endogenous to processes of 
institutional interactions, emanating from them. Moreover, the constructivist author Bill McSweeney 
raises the argument that identity and interests are mutually constituted
42.
A  third  major  assumption  of  constructivism  is  that  agents  and  structures  are  mutually 
constituted – although an author such as Wendt is considered to privilege the structure. Thus, the 
majority of constructivists claim to share the structurationist perspective which emphasizes both the 
impact  of  non-material structures  on  identities  and interests  and  the role  of  actors’ practices  in 
maintaining and transforming these structures
43.
The  assumptions  shared  by  the  constructivist  schools  in  international  relations  can  be 
correlated with the ones in integration studies. The first observation I need to make in order to 
determine the assumptions of constructivism in integration studies is that even though it can be used 
to  generate  theoretical  propositions  and  hypotheses  that  can  be  tested  or  supplemented  with 
rationalist explanations of institutional effects, authors like Risse consider that constructivism does 
not present itself as a concrete integration theory, but rather as an ontological or meta-theoretical 
perspective
44. The same author considers that the emphasis on the ideational, cultural and discursive 
origins of national preferences is complementary, rather than substitutable to agent-based rationalist 
approaches
45. However, the extended use of constructivism in integration studies, if not as a theory 
but  as  an  analytical  framework,  and  the  interest  shown  in  integrating  its  assumptions  by  the 
representatives of other integration theories (Frank Schimmelfennig
46, Ulrich Sedelmeier
47) can be 
interpreted as a confirmation of the theoretical and analytical value provided by this approach. 
39  This  presentation  of  the  general  characteristics  of  constructivist  approaches  draws  on  Reus-Smith, 
“Constructivismul”. 
40 Reus-Smith, “Constructivismul”, 215. 
41 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
20;
42  Bill  McSweeney,  Security,  Identity  and  Interests:  A  Sociology  of  International  Relations  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), Ch. 7 especially 130. 
43 Reus-Smith, “Constructivismul”, 216. 
44 Risse, “Social Constructivism…”, 158. 
45 Risse, “Social Constructivism…”, 146. 
46 Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO….
47 Ulrich Sedelmeier, „Collective Identity”, in Contemporary European Foreign Policy, ed. Walter Carlsnaes 
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In the field of European integration theories, constructivist approaches must be based on three 
foundations: to view the units on every level as social constructs, to asses the political significance of 
these units in the nature of the processes for which they provide containers and not to assume the 
primacy  of  any  level
48.  As  we  will  see  in  the  next  part  of  this  section,  these  epistemological 
directions  were  more  or  less  pursued  in  constructivist  research  regarding  the  EU.  However, 
regardless of the privileged level of analysis (system, unit, or both), constructivist approaches take 
into consideration the fact that states’ identities influence their interests and policies, even in the field 
of security, considered to be a part of high politics. In addition, changes in the collective identity of 
actors inside states can modify their interests in the international environment
49. Thus, in the case of 
the EU, collective identities may affect the attitude of governments towards European treaty reform 
in  two  ways  which  are  often  complementary:  governmental  elites  make  choices  on  European 
integration on the basis of their identities and/or the public develops preferences to which the elites 
conform in order to gain votes. This last relation includes influences from both directions: even 
though elites are constrained by public opinion, the latter can be influenced by the discourses of the 
elites
50.
Koenig-Archibugi also considers that a supplementary explanatory factor (in addition to the 
identity of governmental elites and of the public), important for the perceptions on supranational 
integration in CFSP, is the constitutional culture of a state. The latter is defined as the image that a 
state has regarding its sovereignty and the legitimacy and practice of multi-level governance inside 
its territory. The author identifies two such cultures: one that conceives of sovereignty as unitary and 
indivisible  and  whose  prerogatives are  mostly  centralized (France,  UK),  the  other  in  which  the 
prerogatives  of  sovereignty  can  and  ought  to  be  distributed  between  multiple  territorial  levels, 
according  to  the  principles  of  subsidiarity  or  of  comparative  efficiency.  The  article  of  Koenig-
Archibugi concludes that keeping the prerogatives of sovereignty at the level of the state is not a 
purpose shared equally by all states, because some of them have shown a willingness to promote 
strong forms of political integration in Europe
51.
Another  direction  of  research  in  constructivist  integration  studies  emphasizes  the  treaty 
reform process, a research subject traditionally dominated by liberal intergovermentalists. However, 
in the constructivist approach, the focus is rather on the structurationist perspective -as opposed to a 
liberal IG focus on actors with exogenously determined interests, and on accepting a larger category 
of actors exerting influence on the treaty reform process. The influence of structure refers to the 
established  formalities  and  routine  practices  of  intergovernmental  conferences  and  to  the  path-
dependent  institutional  developments  but  also  to  the  discourses  that  constrain  and  define  the 
preferences of the actors involved
52.
A different direction of research, sharing the same analytical framework, seeks to explain and 
interpret the enlargement of the EU in the context of the substantial financial cost involved by this 
process, especially in the last wave. This approach stresses that the enlargement to the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe can be explained only by taking into consideration the acceptance of 
norms and of shared standards of legitimacy according to which the EU cannot reject the requests of 
membership from countries that invoke values like democracy and the free market. Such an approach 
that appeals to the explanatory power of ideational and normative factors is characteristic to Frank 
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Schimmelfennig
53. Although he is rather a liberal IG his analyses try to find a “third way” between 
rationalist  and  constructivist  research  programmes.  However,  for  Schimmelfennig  the  norms  of 
democracy and free market do not constitute the identity of member governments of the EU, but are 
rather  external  constrains  for  governments  that  are  preoccupied  by  their  reputation  on  the 
international stage. 
Another  constructivist  way  to  approach  issues  concerning  the  CFSP  and  enlargement  is 
through  reference  to  the  construction  of  EU’s  identity  in  relation  to  a  significant  “Other”.  For 
example, the discourse about the EU as a normative or civilian power constructs the USA as its 
“Other”
54. In a different  line  of thought, the  EU’s “Other”  is not a spatial  one, but  a temporal 
“Other”. As Ole Waever argues, it is “Europe’s own past that should not be allowed to become its 
future”
55. In this interpretation, the European past, characterized by militarism, nationalism and the 
balance of power as a norm of behaviour in international relations is the major securitization that the 
EU  states  operate.  Scholars  such  as  Rumelili  reject  this  view  arguing  that  internally  located 
difference does not exclude difference located externally and that the latter can be a source of tension 
in the Self/Other interactions between the EU and its neighbours and prospective members
56.
A closely related research strand analyzes  two opposite trends in the construction of the 
European polity. The first emphasizes the idea of “United in Diversity” and values like democracy, 
human rights, the rule of law, and social market economy. From this perspective, the European 
institutions seek to construct a European post-national civic identity whose values are sought and 
embraced  by  the  ones  who aspire  to  become  members.  Such  a  conceptualization  of  identity  is 
inclusive to those perceived as being the “Other”. A second construction of European identity is the 
more exclusive  one  that  emphasizes  the  idea  of “fortress  Europe”,  with  a  common history  and 
cultural heritage based on Judeo-Christian values. This last vision of Europe was brought forward by 
Euro-sceptics and right-wing politicians and became salient in the debates concerning immigration 
from outside the EU and Turkey’s prospective membership in the EU
57.
The methods of research used by the above mentioned constructivist approaches include the 
analysis of the dominant discourses and practices adopted in the performance of identity and the 
analysis of the processes of socialization. From the perspective of these approaches, discourses can 
be  seen  as  guiding  political  action  towards  appropriate  behaviour  in  the  context  of  an  agreed 
environment
58.
In  conclusion,  the  added  value  of  constructivist  approaches  to  European  integration  is 
threefold
59. First of all, by accepting the mutual constitution of agent and structure, it can help us 
understand better the impact of Europeanization on the state. The fact that constructivism emphasizes 
the constitutive effects of laws, rules and policies, allows us to study how are actors’ identities and 
interests shaped. Membership in the EU influences the way in which actors perceive themselves and 
are perceived by the others and involves the voluntary acceptance of a specific political order as 
legitimate
60. Moreover, analyses from a structurationist perspective focus both on the way in which 
the global structural environment contributes to the emergence of an identity for the EU and on the 
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way that actors inside de EU define the global environment in order to give a reason for a cohesive 
identity of the EU
61. Second of all, using constructivism we can investigate the degree to which the 
cohesion of the EU in international relations influences the perceptions of other actors about EU’s 
actorness
62. The third way in which constructivism can help us study European integration is through 
the discursive approaches that allow us to examine how the EU and Europe are constructed, how 
other actors relate to this structure and how a European public sphere is developed.  
The dynamics of identities and interests inside the CFSP 
In the next section I will make a short presentation of the evolution of the CFSP without going 
into details. Then, I will approach the analysis of the CFSP from the perspective of the assumptions 
presented in the previous sections and I will include relevant examples in the course of the evolution 
of CFSP. 
  The origins of the CFSP can be detected in the European Political Cooperation (EPC) which 
was started in 1970. Before this moment only cooperation inside international trade negotiations 
existed. The necessity of creating an instrument which would be more efficient than the EPC, for 
managing foreign policy and security, was illustrated by events such as the Gulf War, the wars in 
Yugoslavia and other external factors associated most often with the end of the Cold War. The 
essential  characteristic  of  the  EPC  was  its  strictly  intergovernmental  structure  and  its  weak 
institutionalization.  
  The entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty also meant the creation of CFSP. The latter 
was to be a part of the so-called pillar structure together with the European Communities -the first 
pillar- and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)-the third pillar. Despite the criticism from the partisans of 
a more profound “communitarisation” of the CFSP, the Maastricht Treaty represented the moment 
when the CFSP was institutionalized as a sector of European policy. The importance of the TEU for 
the  institutionalization  and  governance  of  the  CFSP  is  illustrated  by  four  effects  that  it  had:  it 
involved a greater coherence and rationalization of policy-making in this field; it made CFSP legally 
binding for the member states, including compliance mechanisms; it introduced several authoritative 
decision-making rules, such as qualified majority voting (QMV) –even if for a small number of 
issues- and allowed for a greater degree of autonomy for the organizational actors in the European 
foreign policy
63. What is significant for the TEU is the explicit mention, in the Preamble, article B 
and article J.4.1 the necessity for the EU to assert its identity on the international scene that could 
manifest  itself  thorough  a  common  defence  policy,  “which  might  in  time  lead  to  a  common 
defence”
64.
  The  next  treaty  taken  into  discussion,  the  Amsterdam  Treaty,  included,  besides  the 
provisions related to the coherence of the CFSP and common interests, reforms in three other areas of 
CFSP: decision making, implementation and financing
65. Regarding the first area, it was agreed upon 
codifying the doctrine of “flexibility” which permitted a state to abstain from any action inside the 
CFSP  even  if  he  was  required  to  accept  the  EU  decision  and  abstain  from  actions  that  might 
endanger it. Although this provision was an important exception from the rule of consensus, it didn’t 
apply to decisions in the field of defense and didn’t exclude the right to opposition from a member 
state that could thus block an action. Regarding implementation and representation, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam  introduced  the  position  of  High  Representative  for  the  CFSP,  which  also  held  the 
position of secretary general of the Council of Ministers, but was subordinated to the EU Presidency. 
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Regarding financing, the treaty provided for the first time that the EC budget will be the main source 
of finance for the CFSP, although the Council could unanimously decide otherwise.  
  After Amsterdam, the next significant treaty was Nice which entered into force on the 1
st of 
February  2003.  Even  if  the  European  Security  and  Defense  Policy  was  a  key  subject  in  the 
discussions from Nice, and “although until that time the Western European Union was effectively 
merged with the EU, specific treaty provisions in this domain actually were quite few”
66. A notable 
exception  through  which  the  ESDP  was  mentioned  in  Nice  was  the  renaming of  the  “Political 
Committee”  in  the  “Political  and  Security  Committee” and  charging  it  with  exercising  political 
control  (under  the  responsibility  of  the  Council)  and  strategic  direction  of  crisis  management 
operations.  Another  significant  evolution  in  the  Nice  Treaty  (determined  by  the  controversy 
generated by the composition of the Austrian government in 2000) was allowing for a majority of 
four fifths of the member states in order to suspend certain rights for a member that violated EU’s 
fundamental  principles.  Regarding  the  decision-making  process  for  CFSP,  Nice  brought  the 
evolution of the principle of “flexibility” into “enhanced cooperation” by basing it on provisions 
applied to JHA in Amsterdam. “Enhanced cooperation” was meant to safeguard the values and serve 
the interests of the EU whenever it manifested its identity as a coherent force on the international 
scene.  However,  using  consolidate  cooperation  was  limited  because  of  the  lengthy  process  of 
approving an action through this method and the fact that it did not apply to matters that might have 
military of defence implications
67.
  The next important treaty for the European integration in all areas, not only CFSP, was the 
Lisbon Treaty. So let us note what were the most significant changes brought about by this treaty. 
First of all, it eliminated the pillar structure of the EU. However, if we take into consideration the fact 
that this structure referred to different sets of rules for decision-making, the second pillar is still in 
place. This is because although Lisbon extended the “community method” of decision-making to all 
domains  of  EU  action,  CFSP  remained  outside  its  area  of  application
68.  The  Lisbon  Treaty 
transformed  the  High  Representative  for  CFSP,  which  only  had  the  attribution  to  assist  the 
Presidency, in High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. He/She is 
charged with ensuring the coherence of external action and is supported in fulfilling this mission by 
the European External Action Service. Thus, the problems of the former Representative, which was 
evaluated as “a foreign policy spokesperson with no real resources or mandate”
69, were surmounted. 
However, a potential source of dispute may be the fact that the High Representative shares the 
function of external representation with the President of the European Council. 
  With regard to decision-making procedures, the Lisbon Treaty stipulates a bridging clause 
(pasesrelle) that allows for the European Council to extend, through unanimity, the area of QMV in 
the field of CFSP (but not in the field of Common Security and Defense Policy). “Thus, the Lisbon 
Treaty preserves a dynamic element in the CFSP by which the unanimity rule can be gradually 
restricted without needing to follow the procedure of treaty revision”
70. Concerning implementation, 
a provision worth mentioning is the possibility to use enhanced cooperation in defence matters. 
Referring to the values and the identity of the EU, the Treaty formulates them as objectives that the 
EU should not only respect but also actively promote. Thus, we will have cases in which it will be 
necessary that the Common Commercial Policy “not only pursues trade-related objectives […] but 
takes into account and even contributes to other dimensions, such as human rights and sustainable 
development”
71.
66 Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy…, 234; 
67 Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy…, 235-236; 
68  Jan  Wouters,  Dominic  Coppens, Bart De  Meester “The European Union’s External Relations after  the 
Lisbon Treaty” in The Lisbon Treaty EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty?, ed. Stefan Griller and 
Jacques Ziller (Viena: SpringerWienNewYork, 2008), 147-148; 
69 Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy…, 258; 
70 Wouters, Coppens, De Meester, “The European Union’s External Relations…”, 163; 
71 Wouters, Coppens, De Meester, “The European Union’s External Relations…”, 148-149; 1706  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Administration
Identity: explanatory factor or epiphenomenon  
In one of studies concerning the CFSP, Smith
72 argues that interests also depend on social 
interaction and discursive practices, so that member states of the EU can find cooperative solutions 
even without a hegemonic leader of quid pro quo negotiations. As I’ve seen, IG stresses the fact that 
states behave in terms of narrowly defined rational instrumentality and their positions regarding 
policies derive from internal concerns of governmental elites. Smith argues that rather than following 
this path, EU member states have learned to define some of their foreign policy preferences, even if 
not all, in terms of collectively determined values and purposes. This does not mean that member 
states started to behave irrationally, but rather that the shared purposes of the EU have become part of 
their interest calculations because of the evolution of EPC/CFSP. In the latter case, the main reason 
for the gradual transition from the logic of consequentiality to the logic of appropriateness is the fact 
that the EU’s institutional mechanisms discouraged the formation of fixed national preferences on a 
rising number of issues. These mechanisms also socialized the involved elites in the direction of 
articulating a common European policy on these issues.  
According to the logic of appropriateness, the decision-makers and policy-makers do not just 
calculate which strategy is the best in order to promote their interests in a given situation, but also ask 
themselves which is their specific role in that situation and what obligations prescribes that role. 
Thus, the formation of preferences -which actors may pursue strategically – is endogenous to social 
interaction and to the process of identity and social role formation
73. From this perspective, highly 
institutionalized social environments condition actors to rely on values, ideas and shared knowledge 
when they make a decision. When institutions are missing or weak, as was the case with the EPC, 
states resort to egoistical decisions based on their specific foreign policy traditions. Thus, while 
rational institutionalist approaches can explain the intergovernmental origins and the initial limited 
purpose of the EPC, its expansion, impact and results require arguments based on constructivist 
assumptions. 
  Unlike cooperation on economic matters where institutions often are a rational instrumental 
response to the problem of incomplete contracting, political cooperation does not involve a clear 
result that can be easily measured by participant states
74. Thus, the CFSP is a model for positive 
integration, which involves more abstract and symbolic purposes, a domain in which preference 
formation and perceptions on social standards are at least as important as strategic action. Moreover, 
the fact that the CFSP area does not have clear boundaries (because issues from different domains are 
included  in  its  framework)  the  limits  of  intergovernmental  explanations  become  even  more 
significant. As argued by Smith
75, the fundamental principle of cooperation in the area of foreign 
policy is that UE member states must avoid adopting fixed positions on important issues without 
previous consultation with their partners. This principle suggests we cannot view cooperation in this 
area as a rational instrumental process in which states bring their predetermined, fixed positions and 
preferences to the negotiation table. Rather, the reason that underlies CFSP decision-making is the 
gradual institutionalization of communicative processes directed towards “learning by action” and 
creative, incremental adaptation. 
  Smith  considers  that  this  type  of  interaction,  that  substitutes  the  actor-centred  rational 
instrumentality, can be identified through three criteria. First of all, the way decisions are made is 
different: debate is privileged over negotiation; negotiating favours is not the main objective and 
participants try to find solutions based on the common definition of the problem. Even when states 
show a preference for status-quo and most of the others favour collective action, those that oppose 
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may accept a solution without resorting to negotiations. The result is an increased number of such 
middle positions that reflect the will of the group as a whole, not the lowest common denominator 
determined by the status-quo states.  
  The  second  phenomenon  that  may  indicate  the  transition  towards  the  logic  of 
appropriateness  refers  to  agenda  setting  and  leadership.  As  noted  before,  versions  of  rational 
institutionalism, consider that the most powerful states have the last word on foreign and security 
policy. In cases where the logic of appropriateness plays a greater role, power is defined in terms of 
arguments, language and ideas oriented towards collective action. Thus, assuming leadership may 
come from any legitimate actor among states or EU institutions, not only from those with a greater 
material power.  
  One last element, indicative for the existence of a substitute for instrumental rationality, is 
linked to changing the institutions and policies. Thus, this will depend not only on the discourse of 
the participants, but also on the inclusion of new actors in the system and on the expansion and 
redefinition  of  common  values.  This  type  of  change  may  indicate  that  state  interests  are  not 
necessarily determined solely by the domestic contexts and that they are more flexible than rational 
institutionalists argue. 
  As we have seen, with the Maastricht Treaty and then with the Amsterdam Treaty, the 
foreign policy system of the EU, represented until then by the EPC of the EC, started to develop from 
being just a forum of debates mostly decentralized to a system with its own cooperation culture 
which involved standards of behaviour, shared meanings and a common language. Maastricht bought 
about  the  extension  of  representatives  (“CFSP  counsellors”)  in  the  COREPER  and  more 
representatives from other institutions such as the Commission and the General Secretariat of the 
Council of Ministers. Then, the Treaty of Amsterdam created the position of High Representative for 
CFSP and increased the number of special representatives for certain problems. These provisions 
increased the impact of communication through formal (like the COREU) and informal networks and 
encouraged the formation of epistemic communities of experts
76. This system, supplemented by the 
rule of consulting the other states before adopting a decision in order not to take them by surprise, 
lead to the institutionalization of the “coordination reflex”. As Hill and Wallace note: “The liberal 
institutionalists’  image  of  rational  policy-makers  bargaining  with  each  other  within  established 
regimes leaves too little room for this engrenage effect [...] Officials and ministers who sit together 
on planes and round tables in Brussels or in each other’s capitals begin to judge ‘rationality’ from 
within a different framework from that they began with”
77.
  In addition, concrete actions collective and common declarations increased in number since 
Maastricht, including positions that did not necessarily reflect the interests of the most powerful 
states. Among the most efficient and significant collective action generated by the creation of the 
CFSP and defining collective interests in the EU was the Stability Pact for Central and Eastern 
Europe
78. This  involved  the  cooperation  of  the  Commission and  the  member  states  in  order  to 
pressure candidate countries in the area to solve problems related to borders and minorities. The most 
important treaties and agreements generated by the Pact were the so-called “good neighbour” treaties 
between Hungary and Romania and Hungary and Slovakia. Aside from the Pact, there have been 
other common actions, “most of limited scope but with considerable political impact” which included 
support for the Middle East and former Yugoslavia peace processes and for the democratic transition 
in the Russian Federation and South Africa
79.
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  Sedelmeier
80 illustrates the impact of the EU identity through some notable examples. I 
mention here only three of the most significant. The first of these examples refers to the diplomatic 
sanctions imposed on the Austrian government of 2000 which included the Freedom Party lead by 
Jorg Haider. Although this example concerns the foreign policies of the member states rather than the 
foreign policy of the EU, the reaction is hard to explain without referring to the impact of the identity 
of  the  EU  as  a  promoter  and  defender  of  democracy  and  human  rights.  The  governments  that 
initiated the sanctions might have had instrumental reasons, aiming not so much at Haider, but at the 
domestic party politics, in an attempt to discredit extreme-right parties or centre-right that accepted 
cooperation with them
81. Even from this perspective, it is difficult to understand the participation of 
all  member  governments  without  taking  into  consideration  the  role  of  the  EU  in  the  field  of 
democracy and human rights and the fact that this role conferred a strong legitimacy to the initiative. 
It  would  have  been  problematic  for  a  government  to  refuse  to  participate  since  this  could  be 
perceived as a refusal to act according to the EU’s identity. Thus, even from the perspective of an 
analysis that focuses on instrumental motives, the instrumental use of references to the EU’s identity 
worked only because the role of the EU had become taken for granted. Moreover, argues Sedelmeier, 
this example illustrates that  “instrumental ‘norm entrepreneurship’, motivated by domestic  party 
political struggles, can contribute to ‘norm emergence’ at the EU level.”
82
  Another  example cited  by  Sedelmeier  is  the  collective endorsement  by  the  EU  for  the 
military intervention in Kosovo. From a rational-instrumentalist perspective this is hard to explain 
considering that some of the EU states are neutral and in many cases the public opinion was critical 
of the NATO intervention. “Some policy makers were concerned that the bombing campaign would 
be counterproductive to achieving the declared goals, while others were concerned about the negative 
precedents it might set for the credibility of international law and the role of the UN.”
83 However, it 
can  be  argued  that  the  members  of  the  EU  that  could  have  opposed  the  military  intervention 
consented to the declaration of endorsement made by the European Council in Berlin because this 
document justified such an action by referring to the fundamental norms of the EU’s identity. 
  The third example concerns the decision to collectively promote the abolition of the death 
penalty. Thus, the decision is difficult to explain on the basis of material incentives: there are few 
rewards  from  the  public  opinion  and  it  creates  tensions  with  states  with  capital  punishment, 
especially concerning extraditions. Sedelmeier explains this decision by emphasizing “the legitimacy 
that the EU’s identity bestowed on the arguments of these advocates as an important resource.”
84
  As we can see from these empirical examples, identity  can be used successfully as an 
explanatory  factor  both  for  the  interactions  between  member  states  and  for  their  relations  with 
outside actors. Even though in some cases promoting policies based on norms may be motivated by 
egoistical interests of some governments, it is less likely that these policies are adopted collectively 
by all governments in the absence of some characteristics of the EU’s identity such as safeguarding 
democracy  and  human  rights.  “Thus,  while  identity-based  advocacy  might  have  been  used 
instrumentally, such instrumental use only induces compliant behaviour because EU identity has 
acquired a certain degree of taken-for-grantedness among the member governments”
85.
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Conclusions 
The  aim  of  this  paper  was  to  present  the  debate  between  two  theoretical  approaches  of 
European integration in the field of CFSP: rational institutionalism and constructivism, and the main 
schools of thought that use their analytical framework. I have noted that the assumptions underlying 
the two approaches and the explanatory factors they each emphasize are often different although 
some theoreticians stress the fact that they are not incompatible and try to use the in a complementary 
way. I’ve also noted that some policies, attitudes and declarations emanating from the CFSP are 
better explained by referring to the interactions between factors such as the identity, values and 
norms of the actors than by emphasizing power and bargaining games in which the maximization of 
the benefits of the actors is sought. 
Even if interests, material and negotiation power and interests defined according to these 
factors are useful starting points in analyzing the potential influence of states on early institutional 
evolution,  power  alone  does not explain  the  final  outcomes of this  evolution  or  of  the  policies 
pursued inside the CFSP. Moreover, we cannot explain the evolutionary stages, some of them of 
major importance, of the CFSP only by referring to the logic of consequentiality. The latter must be 
supplemented  with  the  logic  of  appropriateness  and  with  the  emphasis  on  the  transformational 
potential of actors’ identities and interests in the process of socialization inside the EU. 
  In accordance with authors such as Meyer and Strickmann
86 or Fearon and Wendt, I also 
argue for a pragmatic approach that stresses the interaction between changing material structures and 
ideas because “rationalism and constructivism are most fruitfully viewed pragmatically as analytical 
tools, rather than as metaphysical positions or empirical descriptions of the world”
87. Or as Ole 
Waever  put  it,  even  if  power  politics  can  explain  the  initial  emergence  of  cooperation  in  the 
European area during the Cold War they might not explain much in the present because “situations 
can obtain different supporting conditions later on”
88. Thus, in order to grasp the full dynamics of the 
European project we need to investigate its social construction and its interaction with all relevant 
actors.
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